The US election and the crisis of whiteness
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The US election and the crisis of whiteness

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The "crisis of democracy" across Western countries is generally attributed to rising inequality, the hollowing out of the middle class, and the politics of mass migration. But another major factor is demography, especially in the United States, where the threat to democracy tracks developments affecting white voters. Moreover, since demographic trends cannot be easily reversed, America's growing dysfunction is likely to be a persistent factor in global politics for a long time.

By 2044, white Americans will represent 49.7% of the US population, down from 70% today and almost 90% in the 1960s. This change could be immensely consequential from a political and psychological standpoint. For the first time in the country's history, white Americans will be a minority -- even if they remain more numerous than black Americans, Hispanic Americans, and other cohorts. Already, white voters' waning political influence is creating a sense of lost status and marginalisation, as partly reflected in surveys showing that nearly 60% of Republicans "feel like a stranger in their own country".

Against this backdrop, the 2024 presidential election should be seen as part of a longer-term political conflict that will end with either the eradication or the restoration of the country's historical racial hierarchy. Simply put, today's Democrats embrace the idea of a multiracial democracy, whereas Republicans want to make the country "great again" by re-establishing elements of the old white supremacy.

This conflict predates Donald Trump. Republican presidential candidates have garnered a majority of the white vote in every election since 1964, the year that Lyndon B Johnson, a Democrat, won the White House and went on to sign the Voting Rights and Civil Rights Acts. More recently, Barack Obama's victory in 2008 was a moment of reckoning for the white electorate, many of whom began to grapple with the implications of the country's changing demographic structure.

After Mr Obama's re-election in 2012, the Republican National Committee drafted a report acknowledging the need for the party to focus more on attracting minorities. But at the state level, Republicans moved in the opposite direction, doubling down on their appeals to white voters through voter-suppression measures and racially gerrymandered congressional districts. Then, in 2016, Mr Trump tapped into white discontent to win the Republican Party's nomination.

Another Trump presidency would intensify the battle to restore America's historical racial and political hierarchy, given Mr Trump's plans to deport millions of undocumented immigrants. But even if Trump is defeated, the fight will continue.

It might seem suicidal for a party to bet its future on a demographic cohort whose political weight is fated to decline -- even if support from non-white voters has increased in recent years. But the US Constitution provides one explanation for this strategy. As Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt of Harvard University point out, the US system includes several counter-majoritarian institutions that were meant to ensure stability, but that also can empower a political minority.

What counts in the presidential election, for example, is not the popular vote but the Electoral College. That is how Mr Trump won in 2016, despite receiving fewer votes than his opponent.

The combination of demographic trends, a Trumpified Republican Party, and counter-majoritarian constitutional rules will make American democracy highly dysfunctional in the years ahead. While its strong institutional foundations can help prevent the US from succumbing to autocracy, it seems destined for periods of heightened political tension and conflict. In this context, it is not far-fetched to imagine constitutional crises involving the federal government and state legislatures over the management of elections and voting rights; or between Congress and a far-right Supreme Court over civil rights; or between Congress and a polarising president.

There are no quick fixes. Any constitutional amendment to eliminate the Electoral College or reform the Senate and Supreme Court (which has no term limit for justices) would be dead on arrival, because it would need supermajorities in both houses of Congress and ratification by three-fourths of the states. Could Americans converge to the centre and marginalise the far right and the far left? It doesn't look likely any time soon.

This year's election will not yield a binary outcome. A victory for Vice President Kamala Harris will not save American democracy, and a victory for Mr Trump will not suddenly kill it. Instead, it will be yet another installment in the longer-running demographic conflict that started six decades ago, and which shows no signs of ending. ©2024 Project Syndicate

Edoardo Campanella is Senior Fellow at the Mossavar-Rahmani Center at the Harvard Kennedy School.

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