Thailand has human rights role to play
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Thailand has human rights role to play

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A March 4 photo shows 500 women gathering in front of the United Nations asking governments to improve the rights of women workers including 180 days of maternity leave, better labour welfare rights and equal treatment. Chanat Katanyu
A March 4 photo shows 500 women gathering in front of the United Nations asking governments to improve the rights of women workers including 180 days of maternity leave, better labour welfare rights and equal treatment. Chanat Katanyu

The recent election of Thailand to the UN Human Rights Council (HRC) is, in a sense, a cause for elation. Yet it also comes with the responsibility of proving to the global/local community that the country can set an example for good practices and propel the HRC to take effective action on key matters based on international standards. This is daunting in a world of multi-and-mini polarities and poly-crises.

At the outset, it is worth remembering the HRC does not have enforcement powers. This Geneva-based UN body is a forum for standard environs, monitoring human rights situations and advocating prevention of violations, protection of rights, and remediation responding to grievances.

Critically important issues still depend upon the New York based UN Security Council (SC) which has enforcement powers and the UN General Assembly which is the organisation's most representative body with highly persuasive powers.

Yet the SC suffers from overuse of the veto powers by some of its permanent members. In that setting, it is important to ensure intersectionality between all the UN organs for maximum effect.

Secondly, the HRC is serviced by the office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The official UN budget for human rights remains tiny -- at just over five percent of the regular budget.

A cynical observer might comment that it is kept intentionally low to ensure as much disfunction as possible. On the other hand, the presence of that office at the regional and local levels helps to decentralise the UN which is a longstanding top-heavy bureaucracy needing revamping. Thailand should advocate that decentralisation as pivotal for reforming the UN, as well as to increase the budget for human rights protection and promotion.

Thirdly, there are the internal workings of the HRC which invite Thailand's more effective participation. The mechanisms of the HRC include the Universal Periodic Review which is a peer review process whereby all countries are vetted by other countries.

The country being scrutinised has then the possibility of accepting recommendations from other countries, rejecting them, partly rejecting them, noting them, or a blend of these options.

The utility of this process is that it covers all countries; it is useful for monitoring countries which are not parties to the fundamental human rights conventions/treaties. Its weakness lies in the fact that it is a soft process, premised on gentle persuasion, and many countries reject recommendations on essential issues, preferring to keep their blind-spots to areas which need exposure.

Another key mechanism is the UN Special Procedures (SP) which are composed of some 60 special rapporteurs, independent experts or working groups. The members of these SP are pro bono experts drawn from outside the UN to help, as human rights volunteers mandated to monitor either themes (such as torture) or countries with ambivalent human rights records. These members are chosen by a vetting panel comprised of member states.

One good thing about these SP is they take complaints from victims and advocate for justice on their behalf, usually against erring states, but at times they can also target other stakeholders, such as the business sector.

The SP are particularly accessible to the general public, because there is no need to exhaust local remedies, such as to go to a local court before accessing them.

These entities are in need of more access to countries to assess the national/local situation and to share them with the international community as lessons learned. As Thailand's has issued a standing invitation to them, the country should ensure that it has a "SP calendar", enabling at least a couple of SP to enter the country annually to help promote and protect human rights.

Where there are communications via these SP in regard to victims in this or any other country, it is also essential to nurture the understanding that this is not interference in the internal affairs of a state but part of international jurisdiction to promote and protect human rights based on the UN charter and system -- which have universal import. This is a matter of interaction, not intervention.

Closer to home, the human rights situation in the country needs continual stock-taking, monitoring and leverage for constructive changes. A key reason why the country was elected to the HRC was probably its new equal marriage law which reforms its civil code, without limiting it to a binary approach based on the male-female dichotomy. The country has also been lauded for its humane policies on the HIV issue, as well as its universal health care programme. In reality, it has fared well on many aspects of social, economic and cultural rights.

Where it falters is in regard to civil and political rights, hampered by repeated coups d'etats and self-amnesty of coup leaders. A related concern is the impunity factor enjoyed by officials who commit major crimes.

A key example is the Tak Bai case where some officials compressed scores of Muslim protesters in southern Thailand into a number of trucks, leading to some 80 deaths through asphyxiation. The officials failed to appear in court and a key file concerning the investigations was reported to be missing, leading to delays. The 20-year limitation period for bringing charges against the culprits expired before the end of October.

This case is symptomatic of several cases where the state is willing to pay compensation to the victims but is deficient in bringing suspected officials to justice, thus adding to the impunity factor.

Two more avenues might be explored at this stage. Internal disciplinary action might be possible, especially in relation to officials who refuse to cooperate with the justice system. This could lead to penalties in relation to rank, pay, and pension.

Another option is to prosecute the suspects afresh under the country's the new anti-torture law (2023); this law can cover cases take placing before the enactment of the law itself.

At the end of the day, the recurrent challenge is political will -- for which there can be no prescription period.

Vitit Muntarbhorn is a Professor Emeritus at the Law Faculty, Chulalongkorn University. He has helped the UN as UN Special Rapporteur, Independent Expert and member of UN Commissions of Inquiry on Human Rights.

Vitit Muntarbhorn

Chulalongkorn University Professor

Vitit Muntarbhorn is a Professor Emeritus at the Faculty of Law, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. He has helped the UN in a number of pro bono positions, including as the first UN Special Rapporteur on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution and Child Pornography; the first UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; and the first UN Independent Expert on Protection against Violence and Discrimination based on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity. He chaired the UN Commission of Inquiry (COI) on Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) and was a member of the UN COI on Syria. He is currently UN Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Cambodia, under the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva (2021- ). He is the recipient of the 2004 UNESCO Human Rights Education Prize and was bestowed a Knighthood (KBE) in 2018. His latest book is “Challenges of International Law in the Asian Region”

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