
The recent overthrow of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad provides insights into the potential undoing of Myanmar's military regime in Nay Pyi Taw. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing must take note and study why even a strong 55-year-old family empire with heavyweight outside backing still crumbled like a house of cards.
Although the situations in Myanmar and Syria differ, their leaders' overconfidence and naivety can be toxic and create a false sense of security and illusion. Mr Assad had 25 years to transform and legitimise his authority but failed to take the opportunity to transform. Instead, he followed the authoritarian playbook by oppressing dissidents and minorities. His downfall is a case study of regimes burying their heads in the sand.
After the coup in February 2021, Myanmar has been in global headlines due to the Tatmadaw's atrocities against its people, which are not very different from what Mr Assad did to his people. Among resistance groups, including the National Unity Government of Myanmar (NUG), there is speculation that a similar leadership ousting would be possible under the right geopolitical circumstances, and they are waiting for more assistance from their Western supporters and alliances to tip the balance on the battlefield. After the 1027 operation last October, rebel groups have achieved territorial control of nearly half of the country, especially in rural areas.
As such, in the coming months, the action -- or inaction -- of Myanmar's neighbours, particularly Thailand, China, India, and Bangladesh, will be under global scrutiny. These four nations are uniquely positioned to influence the country's future. So is the maverick Russia, the deadly weapons supplier, which is thousands of miles away. The US is another great influencer.
Myanmar's leadership can avoid a similar fate by ending its conflicts with the ethnic armed organisations and launching meaningful and sincere political dialogue as provided for in the Asean Five-point Consensus (5PC). The real challenge is for the Tatmadaw to act before the final window of opportunity shuts.
So, what is Thailand's role?
The recent report "Myanmar and Thailand Relations at the Crossroads", prepared by Bangkok-based think tank and policy research institute the Centre for Strategic Policy (CSP), criticises the country for having unclear policies and positions on Myanmar. The lack of clarity not only affects Thailand's national policies but also weakens Asean's approach in resolving Myanmar's crisis. The report recommended that Thailand establish a strategic dialogue coordinator for Myanmar affairs to align Thailand's diplomatic security and humanitarian policies. The report stresses the crisis tests its role within Asean and its ability to navigate complex regional dynamics.
The CSP report recommends steps to reinvigorate Thailand's role and bolster Asean's peace plan, the 5PC. One of them is to advocate for a permanent Asean envoy for Myanmar affairs with a clear mandate to engage all stakeholders. Others include encouraging bordering countries to walk Nay Pyi Taw towards meaningful political dialogue. Furthermore, humanitarian efforts should be extended to all affected villages within Myanmar rather than be limited to camps or displaced populations.
The report emphasises the need for Thailand to balance its national interest with regional stability, position itself as a key player in resolving the Myanmar crisis and foster peace in Southeast Asia.
At the upcoming meeting on Myanmar in Bangkok this weekend, there will be extended informal consultations hosted by Laos with past, present, and future Asean rotational chairs, as well as countries that border with Myanma and the bloc's dialogue partners, specialised UN agencies and civil society organisations. The meeting aims to bring all stakeholders to broaden political dialogues to facilitate humanitarian assistance.
Like its predecessors, the current government keeps downplaying policy with Myanmar. Indeed, the lack of policy decisions has already confused the border authorities along the porous Thai-Myanmar border, who have to manage the influx of asylum seekers aided by human smuggling gangs and villagers fleeing conflict. After months of delay, Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Phumtham Wechayachai recently signed two orders to establish a special task force to oversee the volatile Thai-Myanmar frontier and another on general border management.
The recent incident that saw the arrest of four Thai fishermen near a shared maritime border in Ranong is a case in point. It could have easily been avoided if the Myanmar maritime forces had continued verifying fishing licences and importing aquatic products licences of Thai trawlers, just as they had regularly conducted before.
In the past few meetings of the Regional Border Committee, Thailand has repeatedly requested Myanmar to resuscitate the verification process halted during the Covid-19 pandemic. But Nay Pyi Taw has just kicked the can down the road.
At the 36th meeting of the Thailand-Myanmar Regional Border Committee in mid-June in Myeik, both countries were quite happy with the joint border patrols despite the naval collaboration being found wanting -- the joint mission has been in operation since 2019. It followed hot on the heels of Thailand's overture to Myanmar for cooperation in naval staff training. In Myeik, Thailand also reaffirmed its commitment to preventing its territory from being used by groups that could harm Myanmar's interests. In detaining the Thai boat and four fishermen, Myanmar claimed that it found materials related to revolutionary groups on the seized boat.
Surprisingly, widespread reports on social media simultaneously went viral about Myanmar's United Wa State Army (UWSA) intruding into Thai territory in Doi Hua Ma and Nong Luang in Pai district, Mae Hong Son province. The incident increases further tension between Thailand and Myanmar. The media and some pundit's comments were critical of the government's weak responses. This could push the security apparatus to set security directions in days or weeks.
On Myanmar's eastern flank, India shares a 1,643-kilometre common border with Myanmar. Of late, it has been actively engaging both the Tatmadaw and opposition groups. This new dual engagement reflects New Delhi's strategic approach to the crisis. India has also been a key supporter of the Asean 5PC and called for an end to hostilities as it also suffers from the influxes of villagers fleeing conflict into its northeastern region. In addition, Myanmar's instability has delayed key connectivity projects that link India with Southeast Asia.
India's recent initiatives, including stringent border management and discussions and consulting with its Asean counterparts, indicate a clear understanding of the high stakes involved. Besides avoiding further destabilising its border, India also wants to balance China's influence by fostering dialogue and maintaining ties with all concerned parties. As the world's largest democracy, India also cannot distance itself from Myanmar's political development.
To the west, Bangladesh has been vocal about the Rohingya refugee crisis, which has seen over one million refugees cross its border since 2017. The reduction in global funding for humanitarian aid for the refugees has compounded the problem. The rise of the Arakan Army and its attacks on key Tatmadaw positions further exacerbate the challenges for Dhaka, which must balance security concerns with humanitarian obligations.
Apart from Thailand, China's extensive relations with Nay Pyi Daw and some of the ethnic armed organisations (EAOs) along its border make it a critical player in Myanmar's peace process. Since the launch of Operation 1027 by the Three Brotherhood Alliance last October, Beijing's role has been under the spotlight. Meanwhile, China has consistently supported the Asean 5PC and called on all parties to engage in dialogue to find an inclusive solution.
It must be noted that Beijing's special envoy has visited Nay Pyi Taw often, holding discussions with the SAC and other stakeholders, including those along the China-Myanmar border. China's economic interests are colossal due to its investment in energy-related projects and the Belt and Road Initiative, which covers areas controlled by the Tatmadaw and EAOs. Delicate balancing of ties with all stakeholders in the Myanmar quagmire is necessary for China.
Over the past decade, Russia has proved an odd but vital catalyst who chose to play its game alone. Russia remains a steadfast supporter of the SAC, acting as its primary arms supplier in the fight against resistance forces. However, the war with Ukraine has reduced Russia's arms sales to the Tatmadaw. However, continued high-level exchanges between the two nations show their deepening security cooperation.
Washington's support of selected resistance groups has been widely acknowledged and chronicled. Any surge in the American so-called "non-lethal" assistance could impact the situation on the ground. During this coming dry season, it remains to be seen whether the Tatmadaw could recover their lost townships -- estimated to number 65 -- in various parts of the country. Otherwise, it could encourage some Western countries to provide additional assistance for resistance forces.
Despite differences in geography, demographics, and governance, Mr Assad's downfall can be a cue for Gen Min Aung Hlaing to come to the negotiating table in a gambit to avoid further chaos and resistance against his regime.
In Syria, international backers of the resistance forces were focused on their goal of dislodging Mr Assad. A similar coalition could emerge for Myanmar's opposition forces. While the prediction seems farfetched, it would be possible if the West doubled its support. Such a development would undoubtedly intensify the conflict and destabilise the SAC. Gen Min Aung Hlaing must decide whether to learn from Mr Assad's experience or repeat his foredoomed pathway.