
As Myanmar's crisis enters its fifth year this week, there is still no light at the end of the tunnel.
The State Administration Council (SAC) is still hoping that its long-planned election, which is tentatively scheduled to take place in October, will finally give the junta legitimacy in the eyes of the public. Given the current standoff on the ground, as well as the changing regional and global security landscape, it is highly likely that the planned elections will be further delayed until next year.
However, even if the polls take place as planned, the SAC won't be able to guarantee that the outcome it has painstakingly orchestrated will be accepted.
When Asean was under Laos' chairmanship last year, the SAC dispatched its most senior non-political official -- a permanent secretary-level official -- to attend the meetings for the first time.
As of now, Myanmar's former ambassador to Bangladesh, Aung Kyaw Moe, is acting as Nay Pyi Taw's frontman, keeping Myanmar's Asean seat warm as its members decide on what to do.
In every meetings with other Asean members, he has reiterated the SAC's "unwavering commitment" to its future action plans, which include preparing for an election, allowing political parties to register with election authorities, inviting international observers to supervise the process and complete the national census.
But what Asean wants to see is more concrete action from Nay Pyi Taw, especially on the issue of ceasefire with rebel groups and the launch of an inclusive political dialogue. Asean wants the demands met, as since 2021, over 6,000 people have been killed, and at least 3.5 million people internally displaced as a result of the outbreak of violence in Myanmar.
Malaysia's Special Envoy to Myanmar, Othman Hashim, is travelling to Nay Pyi Taw this week to meet with SAC leaders and other stakeholders. Malaysia, as the current Asean chair, has said an immediate ceasefire is a priority.
Late last year, the junta expressed its willingness to hold a dialogue. As of now, stakeholders within the resistance groups remain sceptical of this overture. Stronger ethnic armed groups want to continue fighting to retain their territory and maintain economic control.
Others are more willing to negotiate a truce. However, it is important to note that these groups have yet to agree among themselves on their shared future.
During a recent high-ranking official retreat in Langkawi, Asean made it clear to Aung Kyaw Moe that whatever Nay Pyi Taw plans to do in the future, it has to be inclusive and in concert with Asean's Five-Point Consensus.
Malaysia, as the Asean chair, said that the SAC has only made "minimal progress" towards implementing the bloc's plan, which was agreed upon in April 2021.
Under Malaysia's chairmanship, Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim will take a proactive approach to Myanmar. He is exploring all avenues to persuade the SAC and conflicting parties to engage in dialogue and agree on a ceasefire, separately with each group or collectively.
Asean also plans to meet with other stakeholders, including the National Unity Government and other government factions.
As a direct neighbour, Thailand has offered to host dialogues. Last June, representatives from Thailand and the NUG met to discuss ways to break the current deadlocks.
At a meeting on Friday, the Special Task Force on the Myanmar Crisis, chaired by Foreign Affairs Minister Maris Sangiampongsa, managed to get over two dozen government agencies to agree to work together on border security and crime prevention.
Thai authorities hope these outreach efforts will create more room for dialogue between the SAC, various ethnic groups, and donor partners on humanitarian assistance.
Meanwhile, the recent abduction of a Chinese actor by a criminal syndicate operating along the Thai-Myanmar border has complicated the situation further. The report sparked renewed concerns about Myanmar's instability and how the crisis has enabled transnational crime syndicates to thrive along the border.
In recent weeks, senior security officials from China and Thailand have held multiple meetings to work on common preventive measures and solutions to the problem. The topic will be raised by Prime Minister Paetongtarn Shinawatra when she visits China tomorrow.
Myanmar's quagmire has rung alarm bells all across the region. In the past three meetings of countries which share borders with Myanmar -- China, Laos, India and Bangladesh -- officials agreed that more can be done to prod all stakeholders into a dialogue.
Longstanding demands from the international community, such as releasing Aung San Suu Kyi and allowing her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), to return to politics and halt air attacks, have not yet been met.
As long as these demands are unmet, the planned elections will be considered a sham, and Asean likely won't recognise the outcome if the junta proceeds with its plan.
The scam episode also puts an extra burden on the Paetongtarn government to map out its strategy for Myanmar, especially concerning various ethnic armed groups. Closer Thailand-China cooperation is pivotal to combating the scam syndicates. Without a clear direction, the Thai military -- which has good ties with armed ethnic groups along the border -- will remain rudderless.
Today, China is the most active non-Asean player in the Myanmar conflict. Beijing's strong support for the bloc's peace plan has further attracted deeper engagement from other dialogue partners, including India, the US, the EU, and Japan.
China's top priority is stability in Myanmar, given its huge economic stakes there and beyond. Mutual efforts to improve China-Myanmar relations are ongoing. Last week, the junta's decision to make Chinese New Year a national holiday in Myanmar signals its keenness to boost ties with Beijing.
Nay Pyi Taw must seize the opportunity while still having some bargaining power. Despite nearly 40% of the 330 townships in the country under the control of resistance forces, the SAC still controls populated urban areas, external relations, and internal governance.
For the SAC, quickly turning "minimum" progress into "substantive" progress could be a lifesaver.
For now, the Tatmadaw can leverage its urban control and existing regional and international connections against the resistance. Who knows? In the coming months, shifting dynamics could either make or break the regime.