Myanmar's civil war, now in its fourth year, has become a test not just of national resilience but of Asean's capacity to respond to crises within its own ranks.
In 2021, the military overthrew the democratically elected government and created the State Administration Council (SAC), with its military being referred to as the Tatmadaw.
Opposition to the junta coalesced around the National Unity Government (NUG), with support from ethnic and religious militias, leading to a conflict that has ebbed and surged for over four years.
In March of this year, a devastating earthquake struck the nation and created a humanitarian crisis that both sides recognised as necessitating a pause in the conflict. This ceasefire came after many attempts by the international community to halt the violence, including by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean).
Asean was quick to react to the unfolding crisis in 2021 and issued its Five-Point Consensus (FPC), a plan to facilitate a ceasefire and dialogue with the hope of returning to normalcy. Unfortunately, the plan has fallen short of its goals and has been largely seen as symbolic. This has led to a crisis of confidence in Asean's ability to broker peace within its region.
While the current ceasefire in Myanmar may owe more to timing and circumstance than diplomatic coordination, it presents an opportunity for Asean to recalibrate its approach by reviving the FPC through actionable tools, broader international engagement, and a clearer understanding of the internal divisions that continue to hinder a unified response.
5-point consensus
Asean moved with admirable speed once violence had broken out in Myanmar, proposing their FPC in just two and a half months after the coup. The non-binding agreement set out five conditions for a return to normalcy within Myanmar. The FPC included: an immediate cessation of violence within the country, constructive dialogue between all parties, a special envoy appointed by the Asean chair, humanitarian assistance, and lastly, a visit by the special envoy to Myanmar to meet with all parties.
The FPC has fallen short of being the roadmap to peace that Asean had hoped. The SAC largely ignored the plan and stonewalled any dialogue with the democratic factions. Additionally, the plan lacked any sort of enforcement mechanism, and the limited mandate of the special envoys hindered effective engagement. Each Asean chair appointed a new special envoy, essentially resetting the momentum and progress the former chair had gained. On top of all these shortcomings, Asean members also began hedging their positions by opening relations or dialogues with the junta, further delegitimising the FPC. Ultimately, it has become a symbolic instrument in need of reform rather than outright abandonment.
A new ceasefire, a new opening
The civil war has ravaged the country since the coup without any serious reprieve until the recent earthquake in March. The disaster prompted both sides to pause hostilities and reassess the situation. The international community, previously fatigued with the lack of progress towards peace, brought their attention back to the suffering of the Burmese people and pressured both sides to pause hostilities, even if temporarily, while vital humanitarian aid was distributed around the country. It is within this context that the current Asean chair, Malaysia, stepped up and began dialogue with both the SAC and NGU towards not only a temporary ceasefire, but something more durable. Both sides appear willing to give diplomacy a chance after four years of constant conflict. The current pause in hostilities is not a product of calculated Asean diplomacy, but it does offer an opportunity for the organisation to step back into a meaningful peacekeeping role. Asean's centrality, legitimacy, and future may very well depend on its effectiveness in taking advantage of the current opportunity to foster peace rather than waiting for peace to emerge organically.
3-point plan to revive Asean's role
To begin the legitimation of the FPC, Asean should first alter the selection process of the special envoy position to be appointed by consensus for a fixed term of three to five years, for instance, rather than the short and disruptive annual term that comes with each new chair. This would allow for more continuity and time for the special envoy to build on momentum rather than starting fresh every year. A more practical special envoy whose only task is to operationalise the FPC should be considered. A retired senior diplomat with skilful qualifications from any of the nine Asean Member States should be selected instead of a foreign minister who is extremely busy with other important and pressing tasks. The special envoy should also be empowered with a clear mandate that allows the pursuit of normalcy in Myanmar rather than just listening to each side and encouraging dialogue.
Asean needs coherent plans to support the Asean special envoy, with clear terms of reference and an attainable strategy. The existing FPC needs to be injected with a comprehensive structure and overarching operational plan, including a clear mandate and road map to ensure they can succeed in fostering inclusive dialogues in Myanmar, to take appropriate actions for achievable mission plan, and to put in place necessary mechanisms to ensure all set objectives can be executed and monitored. Once the special envoy is chosen by consensus and given a clearer mandate, Asean should seek international partners to cosign the special envoy and further the legitimacy of Asean's attempts to broker peace within Myanmar. This could be done through an extension of the "Friends of Myanmar", similar to a Cambodian-proposed alteration of the Asean Troika that helped Cambodia navigate its own domestic turmoil in the past. The special envoy should engage not only with the Tatmadaw but also with other key actors on the ground, such as the NUG and ethnic armed organisations (EAOs). Engagement should also extend to external powers, including China, Russia, India, the United States, and the European Union, all of whom hold meaningful leverage to influence the junta.
Appointing a special envoy and gathering international support likely won't be enough to end the violence. Asean must send a unified ultimatum to the SAC that warns the junta to engage in good faith or face global scrutiny. Asean can leverage platforms such as the United Nations General Assembly and the Security Council to bring attention to the obstructive actions of the SAC and further isolate the junta. A coordinated message must be maintained among the numerous special envoys from external parties to increase the effectiveness of the ultimatum, making the support of the Friends of Myanmar vital, given some of their own appointed special envoys.
Beyond international condemnation in the UN, Asean must be ready to suspend Myanmar from the regional organisation should progress continue to be elusive. Asean took similar action in 1997 when Cambodia was up for membership but needed to settle the domestic political dispute prior to joining. This tool proved effective then and may also work today. Suspension would send a regional and global signal that Asean will not be an enabler of authoritarian obstruction. While this may prove risky, Asean's credibility as a peace builder makes it necessary. Empowering a special envoy via consensus and international backing, issuing an effective ultimatum, and finding ways to threaten obstructive parties are essential components of a rehabilitated FPC.
Internal contradiction and the roadblocks to peace
While the revival of the FPC is important and necessary, it will not exist in a vacuum. Asean must acknowledge the contradictions within its own organisation that hinder peace. Some Asean members have been engaging with the SAC since the very beginning, viewing a military vs democracy conflict uneasily. It is no secret that some Asean members' political ecosystems are heavily influenced by their own militaries. No matter how much potential the reinvigorated FPC may have, if Asean is not united in its commitment to its goals, it will fail. Internal coherence is the foundation of external credibility. Asean must resolve its internal contradictions in order to advance beyond symbolism into real diplomacy.
From symbolism to strategy
Asean must be resolute and united in its engagement with the Tatmadaw to stop the senseless violence and be able to engage in dialogue with all domestic stakeholders. The current ceasefire in Myanmar, though a product of circumstances, offers Asean a rare opportunity to act authoritatively. The FPC must evolve into a more enforceable, multilateral strategy that includes international partners and a recalibrated strategy for a reconfigured special envoy. The three-point plan offers a practical roadmap for Asean to regain the initiative in returning Myanmar to normalcy. ASEAN's credibility as a regional actor depends not on waiting for peace to emerge but on being willing to actively shape it.
Ambassador Pou Sothirak is a Distinguished Senior Adviser of the Cambodian Center for Regional Studies (CCRS). Peyson Hunt is a Senior Visiting Research Fellow at the Cambodian Center for Regional Studies (CCRS).