Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha's recent participation in the second Belt and Road Forum (BRF) in Beijing was problematic on many levels. On what basis did Gen Prayut negotiate a rail deal between Thailand and China? What are the details and cost-benefit considerations of this deal? The lack of transparency and public accountability surrounding the Thailand and China rail plan is likely to pose future questions and problems for a huge infrastructure project Thailand can use, but according to whose terms its people must be the main beneficiary.
When Chinese President Xi Jinping hosted the first BRF last year to build international cooperation and support around his signature geo-strategy, known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), Thailand was not invited. At the time, it was viewed in some quarters that Thailand was not included because it had been decidedly slow to develop its 607-kilometre rail line from Bangkok to Nong Khai, to connect with the Kunming-Vientiane rail network being built and readied for 2022. The Kunming-Vientiane rail is the BRI's pilot project of sorts, as it would connect southern China with mainland Southeast Asia in one of six pathways known as the China-Indo-China Peninsular Economic Corridor.
As China has recalibrated its BRI strategy to address and overcome global pushback against the so-called "debt traps" from countries such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Malaysia, Beijing has become more inclusive and conciliatory. The BRI has gained a second wind in a "2.0" version, still intact and on track, with new emphases on anti-corruption and debt sustainability in accordance with international standards.
China's interests in the BRI are loud and clear. Its superpower role and reception in international affairs will hinge on this colossal infrastructure and connectivity project, formally known as the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR). The BRI's huge size and scope straddle the Eurasian landmass and waterways from the South China Sea through the Indian Ocean to eastern Africa, with an estimated long-term funding to the tune of at least US$900 billion, and probably a lot more.
Yet China's monumental geostrategic developmental project across oceans and continents has been around for just under six years. And the BRI so far has not gone down well with partner countries. Like its other ventures, such as the Lancang-Mekong Initiative around the Mekong River in mainland Southeast Asia and weaponised artificial islands in the South China Sea, China has a tendency to make and shape outcomes on the ground as done deals, and then expect others to adjust to them.
What China has needed to do is be more bottom-up and consultative, listen to others and incorporate what they think and say into decision-making processes. Ramming infrastructure projects down the BRI pipes has proved counterproductive, undermining China's global standing as it tries to stand its ground vis-à-vis the United States. Evidence suggests China is learning by doing, making it up as it goes along with the broad BRI blueprint in mind.
Indeed, the second BRF summit is China's answer to global demands for transparency and sustainability.
It is Thailand, however, whose interests are unclear due to a lack of representative government. Having seized power in a 2014 coup, Gen Prayut is deprived of the domestic political legitimacy needed to make such a costly and far-reaching deal with China. Yet he has reportedly signed a memorandum of cooperation with China, thereby committing Thailand to build the rail route from the capital to Nong Khai, first starting with a 252km connection between Bangkok and Nakhon Ratchasima worth 179 billion baht. The other 355km stretch to Nong Khai is estimated to cost 211 billion baht.
The project financing may involve large loans with interest from China's development banks. If this is the case, the full terms of these loans must be revealed and compared to international financing benchmarks.
Thailand is no stranger to governments making dubious deals without public accountability. In the early 2000s, the government under then-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra conducted a series of bilateral free-trade agreements that involved conflicts of interest in favour of Thai big businesses, including his own. These deals became a basis for public scrutiny, street protests, and the overthrow of the Thaksin government in 2006. Somehow the people who demonstrated against the shady and shoddy deals then appear to be muted now.
It is unacceptable to have a Thai government that does not truly represent the Thai people making deals abroad at its own behest and discretion without transparency and accountability, especially because a general election had just been held and a new incoming government is being expected. If Gen Prayut and his loyalists electorally manoeuvre their way into office again, Thailand's international agreements, with China as well as with other countries, would be justified and underpinned by domestic political legitimacy. Until then, foot-dragging should be the Thai response to the Chinese rail overture, just as it has been the case over the past several years, which has seen the kingdom stuck building a symbolic 3.5km of rail in Pak Chong district of Nakhon Ratchasima to show its interest in such projects to the Chinese.
Dealing with China as an authoritarian government that took power by force is a weak hand. China has the upper hand vis-à-vis Thailand because Beijing knows the junta-led government is not fully welcome, embraced or engaged by other major powers. The authoritarian space in international diplomacy is where China can squeeze concessions and impose leverage. While China is shrewd to recalibrate its BRI to meet global expectations, current Thai leaders are being much less smart to kowtow to China.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, PhD, teaches at the Faculty of Political Science and directs the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University.