It is hard to believe today that Thailand's Democrat Party was widely worth rooting for not so long ago. In past eras of military-authoritarianism, Democrat MPs used to be seen as a force for good, pitted against ruling generals in support of popular rule. Somehow during the current military regime that dates back to the September 2006 coup, Thailand's oldest party has tilted away from democracy towards authoritarianism. But just as the party is demoralised and in disarray, it offers a silver lining in new and fresh faces that could offer a way forward if party elders are willing to step aside.
While its record in the 1940s-80s was mixed, alternately fighting as a conservative political force and for a more open political space against dictatorship, the Democrat Party had come into its own by the early 1990s, heralding its heyday decade. It formed two governments that crucially mattered, the first to leave a brutal military dictatorship behind, the latter to salvage what was left of Thailand's economy after nearly a decade of mismanagement and corruption.
Just days before the 22 March 1992 election, when an earlier junta was in control with its own party called Samakkhi Tham (Justice Unity) and a military-inspired constitution, the deck was stacked for a pro-military post-election government. It was the first time nationally televised political debates were aired. All major party leaders were allowed to bring another member along. Democrat leader Chuan Leekpai brought with him an Oxford-educated, eloquent and erudite first-time MP candidate, with boyish good looks to boot. His name was Abhisit Vejjajiva, just 27 at the time. He took Thai politics by storm.
Following the May 1992 crisis, when the disguised military dictatorship under Samakkhi Tham was overthrown by street protests in Bangkok, the Democrat Party edged out rivals to win the September 1992 poll. It was the core of the "angelic" parties in opposing the "demonic" pro-military camp. But the Chuan-led coalition government was later upended by a land reform scandal, where party stalwart Suthep Thaugsuban was accused of distributing 592 plots of Phuket land to 11 wealthy local families instead of the intended 489 farmers.
The Democrat Party then lost two consecutive elections in July 1995 and November 1996, the latter by one seat involving vote-counting irregularities after a mysterious power blackout. In both cases, the Democrats won seats in all regions, including the North and Northeast. While its reliable stronghold was the South, the party captured the majority of Bangkok's support in 1996 from its rival Palang Dharma and Prachakorn Thai parties. Even though he could have contested the matter, Mr Chuan conceded with dignity after losing the one controversial seat and the potential to form government in the 1996 poll.
After the gross mismanagement of the government of Chavalit Yongchaiyudh in 1996-97, marked by the flotation and devaluation of the baht, the Democrat Party was voted in parliament to head a new coalition government and oversee an unpopular but ultimately successful bailout programme administered by the International Monetary Fund. Flanking Mr Chuan in cabinet were technocrats and policy professionals, such as Surin Pitsuwan on foreign affairs and Supachai Panitchpakdi on macroeconomic management. It was a time when Democrat Party voters felt proud and tall even though the Thai economy was down and Thailand's international standing was in doubt.
All that changed a decade on. This time the political juggernaut behind Thaksin Shinawatra took Thai politics by storm. His party machine won elections handily in January 2001, February 2005, December 2007, and July 2011. Notably, in 2001 and 2005, Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai Party won 28 and 32 out of 37 MP seats in Bangkok, taking the capital away from the Democrats. Thai Rak Thai also would have won the invalidated April 2006 poll squarely had the Democrat Party, under Mr Abhisit's leadership by this time, not boycotted it. In another invalidated poll in February 2014, the Democrat Party also boycotted it, while some party members effectively disrupted the entire poll process by physically preventing candidate registration and voting.
Each of these two election boycotts partly paved the way for the 2006 and May 2014 military coups. Through their boycotts, the Democrat Party set bad precedents for Thailand's fledgling democratisation by opting out at will when electoral defeat was imminent. Pinpointing where the Democrat Party began to lose its way would have to focus on the first boycott in 2006.
At issue was Thaksin's winning ways that coincided with his conflicts of interest and abuse of power. As Thaksin increasingly monopolised Thai politics and lined state concessions and government largesse towards his cronies and associates, the pushback against him became broad-based in 2005-06, spearheaded by the People's Alliance for Democracy, which included elements of the Democrat Party.
But when Thaksin dissolved the national assembly and called for elections, the Democrats' boycott was the wrong answer. The right answer to the Thaksin challenge, as he retreated in the face of judicial assertiveness, was to go back to the Thai people and regain their trust by exposing Thaksin's flaws and offering a better alternative.
Instead, the Democrat Party headed not to the people to see what and how they want things to be but to the conservative coalition, led by the military and other powers-that-be. One boycott thus led to another, overthrowing rules and undermining the fabric of what remained of a political system with elected representatives. By December 2008, the Democrats were so compromised that they naturally struck an alliance with the military and colluded with a Thaksin breakaway faction, which became the Bhumjaithai Party.
The ignominy of military backing after the judiciary dissolved Thaksin's party is the Democrats' legacy for being in government in 2008-11. Similarly, the May 2014 coup and all that it has wrought is what they (and we) now have to live with.
Despite repeated election losses and decisions that went against democratic development, there was no leadership change in the party throughout, a 14-year interval that eroded the Democrats' popular appeal. In the election in March, the party garnered just 53 MPs, its lowest number going back to the pre-1990s. Most strikingly, this time the party failed to win a single seat in Bangkok.
Yet party leaders have not owned up to what has gone wrong, resorting to excuses and denials. And this time, the ruling generals have taken matters into their own hands, setting up their own party and running the post-election country themselves, unlike the recent past when the military left elections to allied Democrats.
Having sunk so low, the party has space to perk up. Thankfully, there is a new breed of Democrat Party hopefuls, younger and fresher, who want a better and more effective way ahead. Democrat members roughly under 40 who have resigned in disagreement with the party's partnership with a pro-military coalition government are a good place to start. They can try to come into their own and recast their party anew, perhaps as the New Democrat Party, by categorically opting out of a military-authoritarian regime of any kind -- no more ifs, buts, and excuses.
Thitinan Pongsudhirak, PhD, teaches at the Faculty of Political Science and directs the Institute of Security and International Studies at Chulalongkorn University.