Appraising China's stance on the AOIP
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Appraising China's stance on the AOIP

It is not easy to decipher China's attitude on the Asean Outlook of the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), because very few Chinese leaders and scholars are willing to talk directly about it.

When China's Foreign Minister Wang Yi was in Bangkok recently to attend the 52nd Asean Foreign Ministers' Meeting 2019 and its related meetings, he did speak on the matter -- albeit indirectly and without mentioning the AOIP by name during bilateral talks with his Thai and other Asean counterparts.

The absence of China's clear message of support continues to puzzle Asean leaders, who have been extremely careful not to exclude the Middle Kingdom in its new, regional initiative. During the 15-month-long process of drafting the document, Asean senior officials exchanged views with their Chinese colleagues on the scope and aims of AOIP. It was part of Asean's consensus-building exercise with major powers, especially with China, to ascertain the grouping's norm of inclusivity.

Ironically, other Indo-Pacific frameworks, while promising inclusivity, are surreptitiously aimed at deterring China's participation -- without explicitly saying so. Other dialogue partners with their own regional strategies -- especially the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue partners, namely the United States, Japan, India and Australia -- have all voiced their support for the AOIP.

It must be clearly stated from the very beginning that the AOIP is not a response to the United States' Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy, nor is it a mutation of the FOIP in any sort.

The AOIP is unique in that it seeks to promote a new outlook for cooperation, creating an enabling environment for peace, stability and prosperity and strengthening Asean-led mechanisms. These objectives would help to promote and preserve Asean's centrality as well as the region's core interests.

US State Secretary Mike Pompeo said in Bangkok recently that he clearly expressed his backing for the AOIP, before reiterating that the FOIP and AOIP share similar underlying norms and principles.

Washington found out during the Obama years that any homegrown initiative from within Asean should be given full support, as not only are these initiatives usually non-confrontational and benign in nature, it would eventually benefit the US and help shape its policies towards the region.

These days, one frequently asked question across Asean capital cities is why China chose to respond to the AOIP in such manner. What's sure is that there are still many issues that China and Asean still need to discuss ahead of the East Asia Summit in early November, in order to secure mutual backing for the AOIP.

First of all, China does not accept the Indo-Pacific concept, which Beijing views as a Western construct to contain China. Indeed, Chinese officials have been persistent in their rejection of the concept during numerous debates with their Asean counterparts.

To address the matter, senior officials from Asean also discussed at length, ways to adopt a new concept that won't offend China. Several names were mentioned, including "Indo-Asean-Pacific" and "Indo-Asia Pacific" among others, but in the end, the group settled for the Asean Outlook of the Indo-Pacific. Still, it is a no-no for China.

Asean has reiterated to China that the AOIP is an Asean idea, which had taken root several years back. Asean views the Indo-Pacific region as a single geostrategic theatre for all-around cooperation between Asian and Pacific nations, and it wants to develop priorities that are important for all.

Secondly, China is worried that the concept will eclipse the progress and cooperative efforts that have been carried out under the "Asia-Pacific" banner in the past few decades.

The "Indo-Pacific" is a highly politicised concept due to its strategic components, from which the FOD drew its key assumptions from. From Beijing's perspective, the FOIP is a mean to strengthen the existing US alliances and security network with an emphasis on geopolitical and geostrategic matters, rather than economic development or regional integration.

Because of the "America First" policy, the unilateral US pullout from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and protectionist measures complete with higher tariffs, China has argued that it would be difficult to convince anyone that the US is willing to do more for economic development and integration in the region.

It is interesting to note that China prefers the concept of the Asia-Pacific because it is an economic concept without any pretense about security. It concentrates on economic community-building using well-defined terms.

Beijing said that under an Asean-led mechanism, the region's economic integration and development would serve the whole Asia-Pacific. However, as far as security dialogues are concerned, China is happy with existing mechanisms such as the Asean Regional Forum, of which China was a founding member.

Finally, China views the Indo-Pacific concept as divisive because a consensus has not been reached about its validity, as opposed to the Asia-Pacific concept, which has received global recognition. Beijing is also suspicious of the US effort to implement a two-ocean strategy, which focuses on the maritime domain, leaving out continental Asia altogether.

At this point, it is clear that cooperation under the Asia-Pacific framework is defined and influenced by Asean-led norms and practices, which include the 10+1, 10+3 and 10+6 processes.

The Asean chair has expressed confidence that the free-trade agreement among the Asean+8 grouping -- the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership -- will be completed by the end of this year. If that is true, then existing frameworks for cooperation should be sufficient to promote regional integration and inclusive development.

Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai had succinctly pointed out the salient characteristics of the AOIP, which include collective gains for all involved, and the sharing of wealth without prejudice. Most of all, he said, the AOIP is not based on a zero-sum game mindset.

Asean now is about sink or swim together, and it should not try to push any opposition overboard, as it might invite a fierce reaction that will cause the entire ship to sink.

At the upcoming East Asia Summit, the Thai chair will lead the discussion of AOIP and how it will be able to interface and synergise with other frameworks. Asean is confident its outlook and broad areas of cooperation will be able to engage all dialogue partners in a new spirit that will bring peace and prosperity to the region.


Kavi Chongkittavorn is a veteran journalist on regional affairs.

Kavi Chongkittavorn

A veteran journalist on regional affairs

Kavi Chongkittavorn is a veteran journalist on regional affairs

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