That coup rumours are swirling again while Thai politics heats up in view of an ominous student-led anti-establishment protest this weekend attests to the weakness of the country's democratic institutions.
If the constitution, parliament, political parties and other related agencies function adequately to uphold, safeguard and reinforce Thailand's democratic system, coup considerations would be moot. But democratic institutions have been weak and systemically weakened for decades because the traditional pillars of Thailand's established political order around the military, monarchy, judiciary and bureaucracy have been strong and consistently assertive.
The chasm between the incumbent foundations of power and authority and fledgling democratic institutions for popular representation now appears untenable. Thailand's democracy and monarchy seem locked in an inverse relationship. Both may not be able to be strong at the same time.
A strong monarchy in symbiosis with military dominance to thwart communist expansionism and provide stability and unity for economic development was what Thailand needed in the second half of the 20th century. What the younger Thais protesting this weekend who were born during and after the 1990s want is a constitutionalised monarchy in favour of democratic institutions to represent and function in their place and interest to reclaim a future in the 2020s and beyond.
In the past, when politics reached a dead end, military outcomes were more frequent than parliamentary solutions. In the 1940s-80s, military coups derived from elite conflicts between civilian and military leaders or among the top generals themselves. Such was the case with major putsches in 1947 and 1957 that sent two competing army cliques to power in succession.
Even in October 1973, when the last major student-led protests overthrew a military dictatorship, tension and competition among top generals were integral to the outcome. In October 1976, a right-wing backlash against the student movement occasioned a hard coup that soon loosened into a civil-military compromise behind the leadership of the late General Prem Tinsulanonda, the then-army chief who became prime minister from 1980-88.
Two related coup attempts failed during the Prem era in early April 1981 and September 1985. The April 1981 putsch is the most instructive of all contemporary coups in Thailand. Organised and led by the Class Seven cohort of the military academy, the so-called "Young Turks," it should have succeeded because it had the allegiance of all major battalion commanders.
But once Gen Prem resisted and was able to break away to a Northeast stronghold with Their Majesties, the coup quickly lost legitimacy and folded. Part of the coup motivation was Gen Prem's term extension as army chief, depriving his deputy from rising to the top. Again, it was an internal military conflict but this time involving the royal family more directly. The coup plotters sought retribution in a sequel putsch in September 1985 but it fizzled in hours due to a lack of legitimacy and army support.
Leading the counter-coup efforts in April 1981 were Class Five officers who in turn would stage their own coup in February 1991. This military takeover was significant because it toppled an elected civilian-led coalition government, although it was infamous for its "buffet" style of graft. After manipulating and transferring their coup into a post-election government, the ruling generals were deposed by a middle-class led movement in Bangkok in May 1992, resulting in violence and casualties.
His Majesty at the time intervened to put an end to the violence, marking the apex of his aura and charisma when all sides submitted to his immense moral authority and role as final arbiter. Since then, coups were understood to have at least a royal acquiescence.
The two military seizures of power in the past two decades marked the first time the masses became involved. As earlier coups were elite contests, the constitutions and elections that came and went along the way with the global wave of democratisation never produced a big winner in Thailand. This changed when former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra, his proxy parties and party machine won handily in 2001, 2005, 2007, and 2011, with large margins of victory. Even in the March 2019 poll, the Thaksin-aligned Pheu Thai Party still garnered the largest number of MP seats, although it did not get to form a government.
Kicking out his government and that of his proxies in the September 2006 and May 2014 coups and December 2008 judicial intervention has been costly to the established centres of power because these manoeuvres awakened and raised the political consciousness of voters who previously never felt they had a stake in the system. In the last two coups, building on the 1981 and 1991-92 episodes, Gen Prem effectively became the coup broker.
Without him and well into the new reign, the symbiosis of military and monarchy no longer holds. It appears there is more of a unilateral influence and control rather than an enmeshment and shared rule. There may be a dilemma between would-be coup-making generals and the palace. Either side staging a takeover may not be able to ascertain if the other side would acquiesce. Moreover, unlike past military takeovers, any future coup may well be resisted and opposed by a more conscious electorate and broader swath of the population, perhaps led by the student movement.
Accordingly, coup-making to reset and put a stop to the ongoing political crisis and confrontation is a huge gamble not worth the attendant risks. The civilian-led governments in the 1990s offered better alternatives.
When the elected coalition governments of former prime minister Chuan Leekpai lost parliamentary support in 1995 and ex-PM Banharn Silpa-archa in 1996, they both dissolved the Lower House and returned the mandate to the electorate. When the elected administration of ex-PM Chavalit Yongchaiyudh mismanaged the Thai economy in 1996-97, he resigned and let parliament select Mr Chuan's second government. These were parliamentary solutions that enabled Thailand to maintain and nurture its democratic institutions.
Having ruled for five years as coup leader and another 15 months as the practically unelected leader of a rickety coalition government because of constitutional manipulation, Prime Minister Prayut Chan-o-cha can avoid a risky coup path by finding a parliamentary way out, including all necessary moves to form a charter-change committee and rewrite the rules for a level playing field to go from there. Otherwise Thailand's political situation will likely become more volatile and tumultuous with none of the traditional backstops afforded by the late monarch as final arbiter.