Under the leadership of President-elect Joe Biden, the United States' relations with Asia broadly and with Southeast Asia and Thailand in particular are set to undergo a qualitative shift in tone and direction. At issue are to what extent Mr Biden will adopt the foreign policy outlook and orientation of former president Barack Obama in 2008-16 and whether he will retain some or reject most of the Asia policy legacy under the outgoing government of President Donald Trump.
For Asia policy under Mr Biden, all eyes will be on China. The Trump trade and technology war with Beijing amid an overarching "decoupling" strategy shook up the region and put pressure on partners and allies of both sides to choose between the two superpowers. US-China tensions were a boon for the rest of Asia. For example, some of the American companies that left China under Mr Trump's protectionist "America First" and "Make America Great Again" stance relocated to Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam. US bilateral sanctions against China's high-tech firms, such as Huawei, also hindered Beijing's ambitions to lead the world in next-generation technologies.
The Trump administration also pushed back hard against China's South China Sea claims, regularly sending warships to fluster and keep strategic planners in Beijing off balance. US-Vietnam relations were given a big boost over the past three years, bolstering Hanoi's leverage vis-à-vis Beijing. That President Trump got on with Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte rebooted the treaty alliance between the two countries, although this recalibration of mutual interests over democratic values undermined human rights in the Philippines.
In addition, President Trump bilaterally dealt with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un with a mixture of stick and carrots that featured summit meetings between the two leaders in Singapore and Hanoi over the past three years. Bilateral relations dramatically shifted from overt enmity to cordiality when Mr Trump actually set foot on North Korean soil from the South Korean side at one point. Understood to possess nuclear weapons, Mr Kim's government has not been threatening to launch long-range missiles at US territories since.
Keeping China in check while offering North Korea both threats and overtures enabled President Trump to gain leverage in Northeast Asia. It also allowed relations between North Korea and South Korea to hold their own summit meeting in 2018. Inter-Korea relations have long been volatile and dangerous but they improved markedly during Mr Trump's time in office. The same can be said of Japan, which also benefited from the Trump offensive against Beijing. But Tokyo took a different tack by warming to China and the US at the same time because the government of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe concluded that the US was unreliable and that Japan needed to be more autonomous.
The centrepiece of the Trump administration's engagements with Asia is the "free and open Indo-Pacific" geostrategy. Although it was originally conceptualised by Mr Abe in his earlier administration in 2007, the FOIP was reshaped and expanded from Mr Trump's visit to Southeast Asia in 2017 soon after taking office. The FOIP was quickly codified as the US policy in Asia, outlining China as a rival and competitor. Relying on support from Australia, Japan and India -- under the "Quad" rubric -- the FOIP implicitly countered China's Belt and Road Initiative.
For Southeast Asia, the US's FOIP meant pushing back against China with all instruments and available resources where it counted the most. Front and centre was the South China Sea.
Unlike the Obama administration's "pivot", later renamed "rebalance", the FOIP came with more muscle, if not always ample resources. The US conducted military exercises with regional partners and allies and naval patrols in the South China Sea regularly. The Trump administration flatly rejected Beijing's territorial claims and weaponised artificial islands in the South China Sea. In mainland Southeast Asia, the US stepped up its engagement with the Mekong countries by setting up the Mekong-US Partnership to rival China's overweening role and influence. The Asean states gained much bargaining power from the US posture and policy vis-à-vis China.
In short, the Trump administration got a lot done in Asia. It has become politically incorrect to say anything positive that has to do with Mr Trump because he is so reviled at home and abroad for his blustery, belligerent, and authoritarian style. But the truth is that Asia excluding China liked much of what his government has done in Asia.
On Thailand, the Trump team de-emphasised human rights and democracy priorities inherited from the Obama years and reoriented the bilateral alliance in pursuit of FOIP objectives vis-à-vis China. It is ironic that royalist conservatives on one side of the Thai divide have been accusing the US of meddling in Thai domestic affairs because Washington over the past three years has been relatively muted and out of action on Thailand's contest for the political future between the forces of autocracy and democracy.
US policy priorities under Mr Trump and Mr Biden will be fundamentally different. There is a hint of hypocrisy or ignorance in Thai conservatives' preference for a Biden presidential victory when they should have been cheering for Mr Trump's re-election. President Trump does not care much about democracy and human rights, whereas the Biden administration will likely take a firmer stand on democratic values. Thai-US relations can consequently be expected to see more tension.
The Biden administration would do best not to jettison much of its predecessor's Asia policy. Mr Biden himself also has to be careful about appearing weak on China because his family is alleged to have engaged in business activities with Chinese counterparts.
Mr Obama, who came to most Asean summit meetings, was a good benchmark of what to avoid in speaking eloquently with lofty goals but having a weak stomach when it comes to the rough-and-tumble of dealings with Asian states, particularly China.
Mr Trump, who came to Asean just once, was nearly the opposite, ill-tempered and unable to articulate persuasively but willing to put muscle behind word and policy into action. President-elect Biden would be wise to combine both, toning down the rhetoric but standing firm against China and multilaterally working with allies and partners like Asean to maintain regional peace and prosperity.