Asean's geopolitical profile has significantly expanded under Indonesia's chairmanship, especially regarding the bloc's external relations with the great powers. Jakarta might be found wanting in its addressing of the Myanmar crisis, but that's understandable given the complexity of the stakeholders involved both on the battlefield and beyond.
At the same time, Indonesia has highlighted the bloc's desire to avoid being a battleground for great power rivalry. In Jakarta, once again, Asean still has both convening and convincing power, as demonstrated last week through 17 high-level meetings and 15 documents signed involving all global players. The most recent meeting was Friday's Asean Regional Forum (ARF), which included foreign ministers from two dozen countries. Like previous Asean conferences, major dialogue countries had unique opportunities to hold side-line meetings bilaterally or trilaterally. This year, the focus continued on US-China relations and the Korean Peninsula crisis.
It is notable that whenever the leaders of rival countries hold meetings and consultations within Asean platforms, their demeanour and tone become friendlier, and their assertiveness subsides.
Notably, the US and China tried their best to show off their policies and goodwill to win favours from Asean. Wang Yi and US State Secretary Antony Blinken had good bilateral talks during trust-building processes. Even Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida had the opportunity to express his readiness to engage in high-level communication with North Korea. Something unusual often happens at an Asean rendezvous.
Lest we forget, the goodwill and reputation derived from the G20 Indonesia's chair last year produced positive ripple effects. As such, Asean recalibrated the bloc's strategic outlook and built on past success towards a new geopolitical environment. Throughout last week's ministerial meetings with dialogue partners, the chair stressed that Asean must become a dominant regional platform, enabling its member states to deal with common challenges and engage with external powers.
Indeed, Asean's effort to mainstream the Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP) is a barometer of the bloc's strategic values to other Indo-Pacific countries. Apart from Japan, which issued a joint declaration in 2020 with Asean on their cooperation under their respective Indo-Pacific frameworks, other countries, including New Zealand and Australia, are doing the same. Currently, 12 different Indo-Pacific strategies and frameworks are competing to take hold in this wide strategic landscape, covering around 40 countries.
Five of them are from Asia, namely Japan, India, Asean, South Korea and Bangladesh, while the rest belong to Western allies and friends such as the US, Australia, the EU, France, Netherlands, Canada and Germany. Each is seeking closer ties across all dimensions with Asean as part of their Indo-Pacific outreach. Some of them, however, have the intention of reducing China's influence in the region.
At the post-ministerial meeting between Asean and China, the Asean chair urged China to intensify its cooperation with the bloc under the AOIP. Asean fears that Beijing could miss the Indo-Pacific momentum due to its recalcitrance in accepting the US-initiated geographic depiction of the Indo-Pacific, substituting Asia-Pacific.
Kudos go to the chair; both Asean and China have adopted the Guidelines to Accelerating the Early Conclusion of an Effective and Substantive Code of Conduct in the South China Sea. The 11-point guidelines will help both sides to expedite their negotiations of the draft single text, which has recently completed its second reading. From now on, they will focus on the so-called full milestone issues such as legality and its geographical scope.
In his recent comment, Rizal Sukma, senior fellow of the Center of Security and Strategic Studies, believes that Asean can mitigate US-China rivalry through its Indo-Pacific guidelines. Asean can help the two great powers manage their rivalries and competition, he reiterated, adding that the AOIP's main objective is to integrate all players into the regional cooperation framework. Therefore, the Asean Indo-Pacific Forum, which will be held alongside the East Asia Summit in early September, will serve as the litmus test for the AOIP and its relevance.
Furthermore, with Saudi Arabia acceding to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia last week, currently, all major powers from four corners of the world have already signed up to the 1976 treaty. This is extremely significant as Asean and Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) plan to hold its first summit tentatively in October in Jeddah. Asean-GCC relations go back three decades, but they were limited to sideline meetings at the United Nations General Assembly. Formalised ties started in 2009 when their foreign ministers met in Manama, Bahrain. With the fast-changing geopolitical shifts in the Middle East, strengthening Asean-GCC cooperation has become essential to further promote stability and prosperity.
In response to the new regional dynamic, China also made a big strategic move by stressing its desire to sign the protocol of the Asean Treaty of Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFN) without any reservations. Beijing wants to be the first nuclear power state to sign the no-nuke treaty. At the start of a SEANWFZ Commission Meeting last Tuesday, Indonesian Foreign Minister Retno Marsudi lamented that although the treaty has existed for 28 years, no nuclear powers have yet acceded. The commission welcomed China's plan as the Asean members contemplated the next logical step to enabling Beijing's accession. Some Asean members would like to specify the scope of the nuclear-free weapons zone in the region, which includes the South China Sea. For now, Mr Retno said that Asean would review the points of the treaty's protocol to make it easier for nuclear powers to accede to and ratify it.
At the press conference on the US side, on the SEANWFN issue, Mr Blinken reiterated that Washington is committed to "the rules-based non-proliferation regime" in response to Asean's efforts to create a nuclear-weapons-free zone. He also said the US would continue and even intensify talks with Asean. In a related development, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov also stated for the first time that Moscow would be willing to sign the SEANWFN protocol if all parties agreed not to develop or station any nuclear weapons.
As in the previous two years, the Myanmar crisis was a bone of contention among various member countries. However, it was rather unusual that the disagreement among leading Asean members over approaches to ending the conflict in Myanmar almost foiled the release of this year's joint communique. After two days of hiccups, however, Asean unity and solidarity prevailed, and the chair and Thailand managed to reconcile their efforts to implement the Asean Five-Point Consensus (5PC). Paragraph 145 of the 31-page joint communique states that several member countries viewed the Thai efforts of re-engaging the State Administrative Council as a positive development.
Some Asean members did not support the Thai efforts to meet with the military regime, especially those in maritime Southeast Asia. They said it would undermine Asean unity on Myanmar and the Asean chair's efforts. Truth be told, the informal meetings Thailand hosted did not violate the Asean consensus as they were part of the alternative approaches to implementing the 5PC as outlined in the leaders' decision last November in Phnom Penh.
Now Asean leaders and the global community know that the Nobel Peace Prize laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is in good health, both physically and mentally. She remains the nominal leader to be reckoned with in jump-starting the dialogue process. She told Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Don Pramudwinai that she prefers to see the dialogue process proceed without any preconditions. Nay Pyi Taw also agreed to have the Asean Coordinating Center for Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Management be the focal point for humanitarian aid issues, including that from specialised UN agencies. After the coup, Asean leaders prohibited the SAC political leaders from attending the Asean annual conference and Asean-related summits.
While Indonesia prides itself on being the biggest Asean member and the world's third-largest democracy, the Asean chair also perceives itself as the Asean headquarters. Jakarta wants to ensure that its leadership can make progress and a difference in ending the Myanmar quagmire. Indonesia has now understood firsthand that tackling the myriad challenges related to Myanmar is extremely difficult. That was why the Asean chair only set up the Office of Asean Special Envoy in the first place, without naming the Asean special envoy precisely. Ms Retno told reporters that the chair had held 110 meetings with all stakeholders, which was supported by Asean and dialogue partners. Despite the seeming progress, Ms Retno did not elaborate on the outcomes of those meetings.
However, with the chair and Thailand's efforts, Asean has remained firm on the 5PC as the main framework to help end the conflict and fulfil the aspirations of Myanmar's people. It remains to be seen whether there will be any further tangible progress on implementing the 5PC in the next few months before the 43rd Asean-related summits in September. If not, Asean will have to review and recalibrate its overall approach related to Myanmar.