Without being labelled as an autocratic regime, the diplomatic posture of the incoming government under Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin will be more vigorous and build on existing progress and achievements. Even though the government's official policy has yet to be announced, it is not difficult to outline some of the salient features of Pheu Thai-led foreign policy practices.
Four major areas are top priorities -- maintaining strategic autonomy with great powers, empowering Asean in all dimensions, advocating multilateral political and economic negotiations, and ensuring a rules-based regional order.
These four pillars will enable Thailand to respond to gradual and rapid shifts in geo-economic, geostrategic, and geopolitical imperatives. A high-level Pheu Thai insider has described it as hybrid diplomacy, borrowing the concept of hybrid warfare. Everything counts today.
The new diplomatic ethos is the direct outcome of the May election, which delinked with the coup in 2014. As such, the Srettha government is blessed as it can jump across the authoritarian-democratic divide with a new narrative of its own making. That will allow the new cabinet to build on and improve policies that have evolved over nearly a decade.
Admittedly, the outgoing Prayut Chan-o-cha government has been working hard to boost the country's profile and economic security through multilateral engagements, but its efficacy has not been as successful as expected. The autocratic imprint continues to haunt and undermine the outgoing government's positive track record.
It is certain, as the sun always rises in the morning, that the new government will continue the same approach towards the great powers, especially the US, China, Asean plus three, Europe, and India. To top it all, the return of ex-prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra also signals the return of highly personalised diplomacy. More than the Pheu Thai leaders would like to admit, Thaksin will likely run the show from the shadows.
In general, Thailand wants to keep its autonomy at all costs amid the deepening US-China schism. For the time being, the country has managed and engaged relatively well with the ripple effects resulting from the US-China rivalry. These unpredictable challenges will serve as a litmus test for the new government in the coming months.
One trend can be discerned: The stronger and friendlier overtures from the West are expected to increase after long years of benign neglect of the Prayut governments. In the early 1990s, Thailand was hailed as a democratic model to be emulated among developing countries. But somehow, weak democratic institutions, undisciplined politicians and their ad hoc political parties and self-interest-seeking elites have continued to reign.
Meanwhile, Washington would welcome stronger Thai support on global and regional issues such as the Ukraine-Russia war or on the South China Sea, among others. The freshly elected government should enjoy better international optics and overall rapport.
However, Thailand has been and always will respond based on its national interest without damaging the longstanding power dynamic and equilibrium. It is hoped that better cooperation with the US should not come at the expense of its excellent ties with other great powers, especially China. Thailand has consistently rejected such a binary approach. Without old shackles, the country now has a wider space to play a catalytic role in regional and global affairs.
As far as Asean is concerned, it remains top and centre of the country's foreign policy, just as it has since its establishment in 1967. As one of the Asean co-founders, all previous Thai governments have prided themselves on strengthening cooperation with Asean. Thailand has never stepped back or been reluctant to support the bloc, and the country is ready to do whatever it can to boost political, economic, and cultural cooperation. Consistency and continuity have underpinned the country's relationship with the bloc.
One can expect a full-throated policy towards the mainstreaming of the Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific, which was announced during the Thai chairmanship in 2019. Thailand will be proactive in the regional security architecture, given its geopolitical location and non-confrontational engagement. The Srettha government will ramp up its efforts to empower Asean in all dimensions.
At the same time, it would be more assertive in consolidating Asean positions and demeanours on key issues. Some Pheu Thai leaders, especially advisers who used to serve Thaksin and his sister, former PM Yingluck, thought the previous government's diplomacy was too meek in showing leadership in Asean, especially on the Myanmar crisis.
Myanmar will remain front and centre in this new government. Peace and stability on the country's western flank are essential to regional peace, stability and economic recovery in the post-Covid era, not only for Thailand but Asean. Although Pheu Thai leaders also have good ties with the military junta as well as the resistance groups, they are without the burden of being branded as supporters of the military junta.
The new foreign and security policymakers must work together to persuade stakeholders to denounce all violence and instead work towards establishing a peace dialogue and eventual political settlement according to the aspirations of Myanmar's people.
Closer coordination and cooperation with Asean and its organs, as well as those from the dialogue countries and UN-related specialised agencies, would advance the five-point peace consensus, especially on implementing humanitarian assistance action plans. Changes are forthcoming at the policy level and enforcement on the ground towards migrant workers and temporary displaced persons along the Thai-Myanmar border.
The key objectives in the post-Covid pandemic era are to keep the unmarked 2,401-kilometre border secured and manageable despite the continued trafficking of humans, narcotics and arms. As of last weekend, nearly 9,000 displaced persons from Myanmar were temporarily sheltering in Mae Hong Son. In the coming weeks, the National Security Council could beef up its overall policies toward Myanmar.
On the economic front, the Pheu Thai-led government will lean on free trade initiatives and other economic collaboration. For instance, it is likely to push for unsettling joint development projects with neighbouring countries, especially in disputed areas. The US-led Indo-Pacific Economic Framework will gain momentum as Bangkok will host the fifth negotiation round from Sept 10-16.
The possibility is also high that the country will finally join the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) after years of recalcitrance. The previous government delayed the decision due to strong objections from coalition partners. One caveat is in order: the national interest comes first in discussing the international economy.
The Srettha government's economic team is on the same page on the enlargement of multilateral trade links and strengthening existing regional and subregional economic cooperation in the existing initiatives. Bangkok has benefitted from the Asean-led economic engagement, as shown through increased trade and investment volumes from its members, including partners from the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which Thailand helped to shape.
Pending bilateral free trade agreements would be on the fast track, and new ones would be endorsed. In addition, the subregional cooperation frameworks such as the Chaophraya-Mekong Economic Strategy (Acmers), the Bay of Bengal Initiatives for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (Bimstec) and the Asian Cooperation Dialogue, which have been revitalised by the Prayut government, will continue and given a strong push.
It is noteworthy that Thailand has served as the current Bimstec chair since last year and this year.
But, Thailand's record of supporting the rules-based international order is still found wanting. Its performance will improve markedly if the polarised politics can be reconciled through the new pro-unity government. Better communication strategies regarding the issues related to freedom of expression are imperative both for local and foreign audiences.
In addition, better engagement and management with non-governmental and civil society organisations is obligatory, particularly international NGOs and local ones with foreign funding, as mutual appreciation of their common efforts is lacking.
Lest we forget, Thailand is considered a regional hub for international nongovernmental organisations, totalling 87 at last count. Despite their harsh criticism of the government's human rights violations and other issues, Thai governments have stuck to tolerance, and so far, no organisation has been expelled from Thailand.
Thailand will certainly be invited to attend the Third Summit for Democracy, which will be held in Seoul around October 2024. Obviously, the new government must ponder whether to participate in the event, which overlooked Thailand twice in 2021 and 2022.
Last August, Bangkok decided to bid for a seat on the UN Human Rights Council for the 2025-2027 term. Prospects for more support from UN members are better this time. The previous attempt in 2014 was unsuccessful, as it came five months after the coup.
Looking forward, with democratic credentials, Thai diplomacy will be bolder and omnidirectional while protecting the country's sovereignty and independence and strengthening human security and economic resilience.