A year ago, President Yoon Suk-yeol inaugurated the Indo-Pacific Strategy aiming to make the Republic of Korea (ROK) a global pivot state, by building a multi-layered and comprehensive network of cooperation with the Indo-Pacific region, home to one-third of the world's economy and multitude of latent flashpoints. This strategy possesses both opportunities and challenges for Korea and Asean, especially with the deepening of the US–China rivalry.
Next year Asean and the ROK expect to upgrade their enhanced engagement to the next level as comprehensive strategic partnership which should also be treated as a welcome sign to navigate US-China's rivalry in stabilising the Indo-Pacific region from unmanageable conflicts.
Although Asean member states (AMS) welcome Mr Yoon's Indo-Pacific Strategy (IPS) adopted at the end of 2022, they are observing cautiously whether South Korea can fulfil the commitment in the support of the regional rules-based order for freedom, peace, and prosperity. Lingering misunderstanding by some AMS regarding the strategic intent of the ROK's IPS could affect the regional dynamic of Asean which can lead to regional division of the grouping. Furthermore, South Korea and Asean strategic collaboration must transcend beyond rhetoric, more toward practical cooperation.
As next year marks the 35th anniversary of the establishment of a dialogue partnership between the two sides, Asean and South Korea's partnership takes a new turning point for the development of bilateral ties. However, this can be done by addressing hurdles deriving from their strategic mistrust and setting specific priorities to advance the common goal of a free, peaceful, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.
To enhance the Asean–South Korean partnership more vigorously, the primary imperative is to mitigate misperceptions regarding their strategic posture in the Indo-Pacific, specifically within the dynamics of involving the US and China.
It's true that Asean and South Korea exhibit different strategic security perceptions. For instance, Asean is currently preoccupied with resolving the Myanmar crisis and issues in the South China Sea while South Korea is engrossed with North Korea's rising military aggression. These threat-perception differences could formulate blurry and rhetorical cooperation when it comes to Asean–South Korean security cooperation.
During the 5th Asean-ROK Think Tank Dialogue, organised by the Korea National Diplomatic Academy (KNDA) held on Nov 9-10 in Seoul, some Asean scholars argued that the key for the Asean-ROK partnership to move forward is for Seoul to capitalise on its image as a middle power and a formal ally to the US to focus more seriously on the security dimension, but align with the Asean way -- not choosing a side -- in the ongoing US–China rivalry. While the ROK's IPS and Korea-Asean Solidarity Initiative (KASI) adopted the concept of economic security, Asean opted not to include the term "security" after "economy" and preferred the term "resilience" where Asean is an "epicentrum of growth". Moreover, the dialogue also raised the question of whether Asean is the right platform, or whether Korea would be better off engaging bilaterally and multilaterally with the like-minded AMS. Either way, decoupling from any economic powers would be counterproductive for Asean and Korea at this point.
Concerns were raised on the ROK's IPS as the AMS views Seoul's security alignment with the US Indo-Pacific Strategy as a countermeasure to China's rising influence and Seoul will likely pursue strategic security cooperation with the QUAD and AUKUS. This would be difficult for Asean to engage with the ROK as the grouping adhered to neutrality when facing the big powers.
With Asean neutrality commitment and different AMS bilateral relations with China, the ROK needs to understand that the AMS might have different preoccupations towards South Korea's initiative and there might be security areas where Asean would prefer different approaches when engaging with China, such as the South China Sea and the Taiwan issue.
Asean also needs to understand that the ROK is dependent on a hard security alliance with the US while seeking economic security with Beijing to ensure supply chain resiliency. Despite the similar values and norms of the ROK's IPS and Asean Outlook on the Indo-Pacific (AOIP), Asean needs to recognise that South Korea does not consider Beijing as a threat to Seoul's interests vis-à-vis economic cooperation.
Therefore, both sides need to be frank and understand each other's position when dealing with the US and China as convergence on strategic trust is vital for the two sides. This is to say that the Asean way of expanding the values and norms explicitly mentioned in the AOIP matches with the ROK's IPS in the pursue for a more effective foreign policies that gear toward fostering sound security relations with the United States and close economy partnerships with China.
Although Asean welcomed the ROK's proposal to upgrade the relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership next year, Southeast Asia has an unfortunate lengthy, and lofty rhetoric history with external partners whose cooperative outcomes are significantly below promised expectations.
The KASI, which is the Asean-engagement component within the ROK's IPS, must transcend beyond rhetoric to match what was promised and action implemented to prove the strategic upgrade of Asean and South Korea.
South Korea must lead by setting doable objectives with precise security goals on what Seoul can and can't do when cooperating with Asean. Also, the ROK needs to make a clear-cut anticipation of what it expects from Asean in the Indo-Pacific geostrategic development, the clearer the better.
The KASI and Mr Yoon's speech during the Asean Summit in Jakarta indicated Seoul's interest in maritime cooperation with Asean. Therefore, Asean and South Korea have the opportunity to dive more specifically into which areas in maritime security can address common challenges to boost stability in the South China Sea. These areas could include naval drills, joint patrol, and training.
On the North Korean issue, Asean stands firm to assist the ROK for the safety of the Korean Peninsula and to prevent the conflict from spilling into the bloc, but the ROK shouldn't expect Asean to counter the rising aggression of North Korea. Asean will continue to be a mediator, as it was in Singapore in 2018 and Vietnam in 2019, serving as a bridge between the two Koreas. Seoul must also make a clear suggestion to Asean if this endeavour is in the ROK's favour.
Asean remains Seoul's important economic partner to offset the ROK's economic dependence on China. Both sides benefit greatly from the Asean–ROK Free Trade Area and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership. Hence, Asean and the ROK should maintain their economic relations with the existing frameworks while also finding ways for further economic cooperation in the long run.
Whether the ROK can play a greater security role in the Indo-Pacific or whether Asean can exert greater centrality to manage the US–China power competition is the area where Seoul and Asean must heighten and strengthen their cooperation to make their comprehensive strategic partnership a reality. Their collaborative effort will surely converge on the strategic space to advance a shared vision of freedom, peace, and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.
Pou Sothirak is a retired academic and former Cambodian Ambassador to Japan. Ek Bunly is a graduate student at Yonsei University, Seoul and Research Fellow at the Cambodian Center for Regional Studies.