A letter sent to the United States government by leaders of the Democrat Party raises the most important question now before the Thai people: What is the legitimacy of the current Pheu Thai government?
Legitimacy fails when people do not accept authority as justly calling for their obedience. The Yingluck administration claims legitimacy based on a political theory of popular sovereignty: It was chosen by the people. But is that completely correct as a matter of good democratic theory?
Where does governing legitimacy come from?
I have been pondering this universal challenge for nearly 50 years since I was a student of Professor Samuel Huntington at Harvard University. Then, how to build legitimacy was at the centre of studies of political development.
The most famous and still persuasive writer on legitimacy is the great German sociologist Max Weber. He proposed there are three kinds of legitimate political systems: Rational/legal, traditional, and charismatic. Each has its own source of legitimacy.
Rational/legal systems _ democracy, communism, socialism, fascism, the ancient Chinese Imperial order, divine right monarchies, corporate bureaucracies, military hierarchies and theocracies _ rest their legitimacy on political theories. If you believe in the theory, you are disposed to accept the commands of that authority structure as binding.
Traditional systems _ tribal chieftains, feudal hierarchies, monarchies, castes, village elders _ defend their legitimacy with the argument that it has always been so and that what is good for the fathers and mothers must be good for the children. These systems require a social consensus in practice, not a scientific explanation of what is the right kind of government to have.
Charismatic systems _ usually religious sects following a leader like Buddha or Jesus Christ or a modern ideologue like Hitler or Mao _ use the personal magnetic power of the leader as the basis for demanding obedience from followers.
Traditional Theravada states like Sukhothai, Chiang Mai, Nan, U Thong, Ayudhya, Luang Prabang, Pagan, and post-Angkor Cambodia combined charisma with tradition as the basis for their legitimacy.
Rulers of these states were selected and followed depending on the strength of their charisma as Professor Stanley Tambiah of Harvard wrote in his brilliant study, "World Conqueror, World Renouncer". I think in modern Thai the concept of charisma in a leader is indicated by words like "baramee" and "wasaana".
Until today, much in Thai politics still revolves around the personal "charm" of patrons who attract loyal clients. This kind of personalistic politics is a "virtue" politics where the special virtues of the leader keep him or her in higher office.
Since 2001, Thailand has experienced a special case of this kind of charismatic politics in the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra. Only once in office he came more and more to replace his "virtue" with the attractive powers of money and generous financial patronage through preferential government treatment at his command.
The traditional aspect of theravada that influenced authority systems was a social and cultural hierarchy tied to the karmic status of families. It was a fluid system of rising and falling patrons at the centre of circles of subordinate clients. Social and economic power was decentralised into the hands of quasi-feudal family heads, some small and some very prestigious but all potentially overbearing.
This traditional pattern of allocating authority has not disappeared in today's Thailand. The Pheu Thai Party and the Yingluck governing coalition both are combinations of personal factions and cultural or local fiefdoms as well as beneficiaries of Thaksin's charisma.
The red shirt popular base supporting Thaksinism combines the charismatic appeal of Thaksin himself with traditional patron/client circles, especially in the Northeastern provinces, through which local patrons enable their followings with personal attention and financial support.
Democracy, on the other hand, demands modern rational/legal legitimation.
To become more and more legitimately democratic, the Thai people need to adapt past charismatic and traditional authority patterns to very different modes of political behaviour.
For more than 80 years it has not been an easy process and will continue to bring forth challenges.
But right now charismatic and traditionalist patron/client patterns of seeking legitimacy are stalling the transition to more rational/legal democratic practices. The populist policies and patronising political practices of Thaksinism actually undermine its democratic legitimation.
Thaksinism practices patronage on a grand scale using the entire government and its budgets to reward clients in the old style of traditional patrimonial authority structures. Votes are required from clients in exchange for preferential treatment. As an anchor for his charisma among the people the ability to reward is tied to Thaksin personally. If he had no funds to provide rewards, his charisma would largely evaporate as it has for many previous Thai autocrats coming from military or money politics backgrounds. But under the rational/legal norms of democracy, it is not permissible to buy votes. Democratic legitimacy must be earned in different, less corrupt ways of attracting support.
At the last election, the Pheu Thai Party won some 48% of the popular vote, less than a majority. If, as a thought experiment, all votes obtained by Pheu Thai candidates through the exchange of some kind of reward for votes received were subtracted from the party's total vote, what percentage of legitimate votes would it still have?
Quite probably the party would have far less than a majority, and so would fall short in democratically legitimating its leadership of Thailand. If Thailand is to move closer to rational/legal democratic practices, it needs to end money politics and validate the rule of law.
Stephen B Young is former dean and professor of law at the Hamline University School of Law and assistant dean, the Harvard Law School.