The decision of the Move Forward Party (MFP) and the opposition bloc to seek a general debate instead of no-confidence censure against the Srettha Thavisin government has sparked suspicion of political collusion between political opponents.
The MFP was first reported wanting to skip the general debate by saying the current government has not used any fiscal budget -- meaning there were no grounds for any possible acts of corruption. Due to delays in forming a government coalition, the current administration has yet to receive and use the 2024 fiscal budget.
But that does not mean that the government should be spared a grilling. The fact that the Pheu Thai-led government has failed to make progress in implementing its flagship policies over the past six months due to inefficiency, as well as numerous scandals, particularly the prison privilege of former PM Thaksin Shinawatra, who returned from self-imposed exile to face penalties, indeed warrants a no-confidence censure, in accordance with Section 154 of the constitution.
By missing it, the opposition now has to wait until next year.
Under its current plan, the general debate will take place on April 3-5, following a debate by the Senate and the final scrutiny process of the 2024 budget, which will take place at the end of this month. The last day of this year's parliament session is April 9.
In response to concerns, MFP leader Chaithawat Tulathon dismissed speculations about collusion between his party and Pheu Thai after the expiry of the military-leaning Senate, which blocked Pita Limjaroenrat's premiership bid, in May.
According to the MFP leader, the opposition is to focus on the failure of the government to honour its promises to implement pre-poll policies and solve problems for the people. The Srettha administration has been accused of turning a blind eye to mafia operations, et cetera, by critics and the media.
A general debate is much less severe than a censure debate; for the latter, the opposition could actually bring the government down. If the censure is about corruption, it must simultaneously submit its case to the National Anti-Corruption Commission (NACC).
There are already a number of scandals that could land the Srettha government in trouble, including pork smuggling, the national park vs Sor Por Kor land conflict, and uncertainty over the 10,000-baht digital handout scheme.
But on top of the list of scandals is Thaksin's out-of-jail detention since his first day back in Thailand on Aug 18 last year, which resulted in the ex-leader eventually being released on parole. The Thaksin case is more than enough to grill Mr Srettha and Thawee Sodsong in his capacity as justice minister overseeing the Corrections Department. Yet, the MFP shows no interest in cornering the administration.
Despite Mr Chaithawat's denial, some observers still believe there is a chance the former opposition allies might reunite later.
This is because the MFP and Pheu Thai are not truly arch-enemies. They used to be opposition allies during the Prayut Chan-o-cha administration until their alliance collapsed because the old powers wanted to separate them, turning friends into foes. The fact that Pheu Thai is now a quasi-rival may be of benefit to MFP if it avoids outright confrontation.
If we look back, we can see evidence of parliamentary double standards. Gen Prayut Chan-o-cha and five ministers faced no-confidence censure by the then opposition bloc comprising Pheu Thai and MFP, which was then the Future Forward Party (FFP), after just seven months in office in 2019.
Back then, the grilling of Capt Thamanat Prompow was based on his shady past, given he had served time in an Australian prison for drug-related offences almost three decades ago and had nothing to do with his performance as deputy agriculture minister. The MFP's claims that it's too early to grill the Srettha government given the budget timeframe are, therefore, dubious.
The 2019 debate aftermath saw cracks in the then opposition as the FFP alleged its colleague of deliberately saving the deputy prime minister Gen Prawit Wongsuwon in what was deemed to be a collusion with the ex-junta elements. Pheu Thai was accused of dragging the debate on until the time ran out, not to mention an alleged lobby within the opposition in favour of the junta's big brother. Eventually, the FFP had to grill Gen Prawit outside parliament
Today, MFP is in the same shoes as Pheu Thai as it faces allegations of possible collusion. This may have something to do with a statement by Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, ex-FFP leader, that he was among politicians seeking a meeting with Thaksin in Hong Kong after the May 14 elections so as to secure a MFP and Pheu Thai coalition.
Mr Thanathorn later admitted that he always considered Pheu Thai as an ally, even if they were on the opposite side. He also said Thailand's politics needs both the MFP and Pheu Thai for the sake of democratisation. In the latest debate, he constantly said that there was not enough information to justify an attack on the Srettha government.
Not to forget that Mr Pita, who is now chief adviser of the MFP, also has good relations with Thaksin, who helped facilitate his overseas studies. Let us also not forget that his uncle Padung Limjaroenrat is a private secretary of Thaksin. That, too, could be the reason Mr Pita has refrained from attacking Thaksin's prison privileges all along.
But on the other hand, it could be better timing for MFP to seek a no-confidence debate next year while cleverly taking advantage of its checks-and-balances role against the embattled government. As the MFP has apparently benefited from two-faced tactics, there is no need to rush confrontation with Pheu Thai. After all, time is on its side, and by then, the MFP will know when to be aggressive so as to win over its friend-turned-foe.
The MFP knows it has gained from ambiguity. By not hitting Pheu Thai hard, it keeps the old powers paranoid at the possibility they might resume their political alliance.